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CRIMINALIZING PROPERTY RIGHTS: HOW CRIME-FREE
HOUSING ORDINANCES VIOLATE THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
ABSTRACT
Crime-free housing ordinances allow municipalities to force private
landlords to evict tenants who have committed crimes or allowed a guest who
has committed a crime into their home, regardless of the tenant’s knowledge.
These ordinances have proliferated throughout the country since the turn of the
century and pose interesting questions about landlord and tenant rights under
the Constitution. This Comment explores a new strategy for landlords and
tenants attempting to confront these ordinances—challenging them under the
Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has recognized two types of takings that are due just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment: possessory and regulatory takings.
This Comment argues that compulsory evictions, as mandated by crime-free
housing ordinances, qualify as possessory and regulatory takings for tenants,
but not for landlords. While the landlord’s property rights have only been
circumscribed because he or she has to find a new tenant and has lost the
revenue from the original tenant, the tenant loses all of his or her property rights
in the tenant’s leasehold estate after eviction under a crime-free housing
ordinance. Additionally, government actors may engage in physical invasions
to effectuate the eviction and “total taking” of the property. The taking is for the
public purpose of reducing and preventing crimes, and the tenant is owed just
compensation under the Takings Clause. Compulsory evictions under crime-free
housing ordinances are unconstitutional without just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
Jessica Barron and Kenny Wylie lived in their home in Granite City, Illinois,
since 2017.1 They had a rent-to-own contract with their landlord.2 Their landlord
was satisfied with their tenancy and had no desire to evict them.3 Unfortunately
for the landlord, and for Jessica and Kenny, the law of Granite City did not give
him a choice.
In the winter and spring of 2019, Jessica and Kenny allowed their teenage
son’s friend to sleep on their couch.4 This friend was homeless and said that his
mother had died,5 and winters in that part of Illinois can involve single-digit and
negative temperatures.6 Kenny is a certified foster parent, and he and his wife
have always tried to keep their door open to those in need.7
Unbeknownst to the couple, on May 21, 2019, Jessica and Kenny’s
houseguest burglarized a restaurant.8 When Jessica learned of the burglary and
realized the teenager was hiding in her home, she contacted the police and had
him arrested.9 After the arrest, she told the boy not to come back to her house,
and he stopped returning.10 In a perfect illustration of the saying, “No good deed
goes unpunished,” Jessica and Kenny faced eviction under Granite City’s crimefree housing ordinance, which required a landlord to evict any tenant whose
guest committed a crime while under that tenant’s roof.11 They challenged the
ordinance under the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth

1

Complaint at 1, Barron v. City of Granite City, No. 3:19-cv-834, 2019 WL 5290218 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 1,

2019).
2
Id. A rent-to-own contract is commonly known as a real estate installment contract, which means the
tenants make payments toward the purchase price of the home every month along with their rental payment. Id.
This practice is an option for those who do not qualify for a regular mortgage. Id.
3
Id.
4
Andrew Wimer, City Wants to Force Landlord to Evict Family Who Did Nothing Wrong, FORBES (Aug.
14, 2019, 11:49 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2019/08/14/city-wants-to-force-landlordto-evict-family-who-did-nothing-wrong/#787cdbac3c42.
5
Id.
6
See Rachel Rice, Polar Vortex to Bring Negative Temperatures to St. Louis Area, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/illinois/polar-vortex-to-bring-negativetemperatures-to-st louisarea/article_398f98f2-e58c-5749-b05f-6b6ba989502f.html (discussing a weather report
from St. Louis, located across the Mississippi River from Granite City).
7
Complaint, supra note 1, at 1.
8
Id. at 12.
9
Wimer, supra note 4.
10
Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
11
See, e.g., Lexi Cortes, A Granite City Family Took In a Teen. Now They Face Eviction Because of his
Crime, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (Aug. 3, 2019, 3:21 PM), https://www.bnd.com/news/local/article
233493077.html.
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Amendment.12 Fortunately for Jessica and Kenny, under pressure from the
lawsuit, the city repealed the crime-free housing ordinance on December 17,
2019.13 Future renters in other cities may not be so lucky.
This Comment examines a previously overlooked constitutional challenge
to crime-free housing ordinances that the plaintiffs asserted in Barron v. City of
Granite City—that the ordinances are unconstitutional without just
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment—and argues
that suing under the Takings Clause is a viable option for plaintiffs and
advocates hoping to challenge crime-free housing ordinances that affect private
landowners and govern their interactions with their tenants. This Comment does
not consider crime-free housing ordinances as they apply to federal government
housing or crime-free lease terms as negotiated in private rental agreements
between landlords and tenants.14 Instead, it focuses on compulsory evictions
implemented and enforced by state and local governments against private
landlords, an issue that has not yet reached the Supreme Court and is being
litigated at the state and federal court levels.
Part I of this Comment explains the evolution of crime-free housing
ordinances and the Fifth Amendment. Part II is divided into three main sections.
Section A focuses on the property rights of the landlord and tenant, arguing that
both have valid property rights that can be subject to takings under crime-free
housing ordinances. Section B explores the main question of this Comment:
whether there has been a taking. This section demonstrates that while there has
not been a traditional possessory or regulatory taking for the landlord, there has
been for the tenant. Section C applies the public use and just compensation
requirements for a constitutional taking to an eviction under a crime-free
housing ordinance.
12
Complaint, supra note 1, at 27. They also challenged the ordinance under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and under the First Amendment as applied to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 19, 21, 28.
13
The Madison County Record, Granite City Votes to Repeal Controversial Eviction Ordinance; City
Seeks to Dismiss Constitutional Challenges as Moot, MADISON - ST. CLAIR RECORD (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://madisonrecord.com/stories/522658996-granite-city-votes-to-repeal-controversial-eviction-ordinancecity-seeks-to-dismiss-constitutional-challenges-as-moot. The court granted a motion voluntarily dismissing this
case in February 2020.
14
Crime-free housing ordinances as applied to federal government housing have different constitutional
implications because the housing itself is being provided by the government. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.
v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132 (2002) (explaining how different standards apply when the government is acting
as a landlord in a public housing project.). Whether a landlord can unilaterally require his or her tenants to remain
“crime-free” is a question of contract law between two private parties. See Lease, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019) (“A contract by which a rightful possessor of real property conveys the right to use and occupy
the property in exchange for consideration.”).
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CRIME-FREE HOUSING ORDINANCES AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

This Comment argues that compulsory evictions under crime-free housing
ordinances violate a tenant’s Fifth Amendment rights under the Takings Clause.
This Part focuses on crime-free housing ordinances and the Fifth Amendment,
including types of takings and the public use requirement of a constitutional
taking. This background distills the law and the elements required to make viable
takings claim for those hoping to challenge crime-free housing ordinances.
A. The Creation and Reception of Crime-free Housing Ordinances
The history and evolution of crime-free housing ordinances as detailed in
this section and confirmed by previous legal scholarship suggest an oftenoverlooked application of the Fifth Amendment.
Municipal crime-free housing ordinances proliferated near the turn of the
century.15 The ordinances copied the federal “one-strike” policy that was
instituted by Congress as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.16 This policy,
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1437d, requires public housing leases to include a term
that allows for immediate eviction of a tenant who commits a crime.17
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . provide that
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drugrelated criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a
public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any
guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for
termination of tenancy.18

The statute was intended to combat the “rampant drug-related crime”19 in public
housing projects in the 1980s.20 In 2002, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d) and the regulations promulgated by the

15
See Kathryn V. Ramsey, One-Strike 2.0: How Local Governments Are Distorting a Flawed Federal
Eviction Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1146, 1151 (2018) (“In the wake of the Rucker decision, many local
governments across the country have enacted CHOs [crime-free housing ordinances].”).
16
Mishan Wroe, Preemption of Municipal Crime-free Housing Ordinances, 2 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER &
SOC. JUST. 123, 129 (2013) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Rucker . . . provided a model for municipalities
who wanted to mimic these provisions of the FHA in an attempt to reduce crime related activity in their
municipalities.”).
17
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181, 4300 (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6)).
18
§ 1437d(l)(6).
19
See § 5122.
20
§ 1437d(l)(6).
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Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that did not require the
tenant to know of the criminal behavior to be evicted.21 The Supreme Court
stated that “[t]here are, moreover, no ‘serious constitutional doubts’ about
Congress’ affording local public housing authorities the discretion to conduct
no-fault evictions for drug-related crime.”22 However, that assertion did not say
that the Court believed there were no constitutional doubts about the government
requiring private landlords to evict their tenants for a drug-related crime.
Instead, the Court held that the law was not constitutionally questionable as long
as the government was acting as a landlord.23 The Court specified, “The
government is not attempting to criminally punish or civilly regulate
respondents as members of the general populace. It is instead acting as a landlord
of property that it owns, invoking a clause in a lease to which respondents have
agreed and which Congress has expressly required.”24 The Court explicitly
stated that its holding did not apply to “civil regulat[ions]” affecting “the general
populace.”25 Instead, it applied to the landlord’s ability to add a specific
requirement to the lease.26 This Comment does not question the ability of the
government, when acting as a landlord, or the ability of any private landlord, to
“invoke[] a clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed;”27 it questions
whether the government can force a landlord to invoke or insert a clause in a
lease that affects property the government does not own.
The decision of the Supreme Court, combined with the efforts of the
International Crime Free Association (ICFA),28 encouraged local governments
to adopt their own “one-strike” policies.29 Cities in 48 states have adopted the
crime-free housing ordinance program offered by the ICFA,30 while Illinois

21

Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002).
Id. at 135 (emphasis added) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 n.9 (1993)).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
The International Crime Free Association is a non-profit dedicated to reducing crime by expanding
crime-free housing programs to different municipalities. Crime Free Multi-Housing: Keep Illegal Activity Off
Rental Property, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association.org/multi-housing.htm (last
visited June 8, 2021).
29
See Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1151; see also Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The
Jim Crow Effects of Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 188 (2019) (“[T]he work of the
ICFA has been to spread the adoption of crime-free ordinances across the United States.”).
30
INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, supra note 28 (“The International Crime Free Multi-Housing Program has
spread to nearly 2,000 cities in 48 U.S. States, 5 Canadian Provinces, England, Nigeria, and Puerto Rico, to
name a few.”).
22
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alone has more than 100 municipalities with some variation of a crime-free
housing ordinance.31
Though they vary, crime-free housing ordinances usually require tenants to
sign an addendum, similar to the language in 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6), to their
lease and require the landlord to evict any violating lessee or face sanctions from
local government.32 For example, returning to the case from the Introduction,
Barron v. City of Granite City, the Granite City Municipal Code required lessors
to obtain a license to rent residential units.33 Any licensee could be punished
through a citation for failure to remove a lessee following notice that the lessee
violated the crime-free lease addendum,34 even if the licensee was renting
property under a rent-to-own lease.35 The citation to the landlord was anywhere
from $75 to $750 per occurrence.36 The crime-free lease addendum was required
in every lease signed or renewed after 2010 (when the ordinance was enacted)37
and was similar to the federal “one-strike” policy, as it prohibited any criminal
activity, especially drug activity by any lessee or lessees on or off the property.38
The Granite City addendum was more specific than the federal provision on
which it was modeled, and, in particular, it prohibited acts of violence, drug sale
or distribution, unlawful discharge of firearms, or any forcible felony by the
lessees or members of the lessee’s household that either occurred within the city
limits or on or near the property premise.39 Some crimes, like forcible felonies,

31
EMILY WERTH, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, THE COST OF BEING “CRIME-FREE”:
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FREE RENTAL HOUSING AND NUISANCE PROPERTY
ORDINANCES 1 (2013), https://www.povertylaw.org/files/docs/cost-of-being-crime-free.pdf.
32
See Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1151. Crime-free housing ordinances can also appear as nuisance
ordinances, which allow municipalities to require that landlords remove tenants for making too many 911 calls
or engaging in other non-criminal conduct and to sanction landlords who do not follow the proscribed
“abatement procedure.” Werth, supra note 31, at 3–4. However, this Comment focuses on crime-free housing
ordinances in the form of statutes and lease addendums that directly require a landlord to evict the tenant if
crimes are committed.
33
GRANITE CITY, ILL., MUN. CODE § 5.142.020 (2010).
34
GRANITE CITY, ILL., MUN. CODE § 5.142.050(C)(3) (2020).
35
GRANITE CITY, ILL., MUN. CODE § 5.142.010(B) (2010).
36
GRANITE CITY, ILL., MUN. CODE § 15.08.020 (2013).
37
GRANITE CITY, ILL., MUN. CODE § 5.142.060 (2010) (applying the addendum requirement to “[e]very
agreement for lease of residential real estate located within the corporate limits of the city of Granite City,
executed or renewed”).
38
Granite City, Il., Ordinance 16,043 (An Ordi[n]ance Amending Exhibit B – Lease Addendum for Crime
Free Housing of Sections 5.142.050 & 5.142.060 of the Granite City Municipal Code), http://www.granitecity.
illinois.gov/docs/CFMH/2.%20Crime%20Free%20Lease%20Addendum%20(00077742).pdf (last visited Sept.
24, 2019) (prohibiting the lessee’s guest or anyone under the lessee’s control from “engag[ing] in any act
intended to facilitate criminal activity, including drug related criminal activity, on or near the property premise,
regardless of whether or not the individual . . . is a household member or guest”).
39
Id.
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need not occur in Granite City at all.40 In all capital letters, the addendum
specified that violation of the lease results in a “material violation” with “good
cause for termination of tenancy.”41 The proof of violation was determined by a
preponderance of the evidence, and a single violation was sufficient for lease
termination.42
There is little case law by which to judge the effectiveness of specific
constitutional challenges to crime-free housing ordinances.43 In two cases, one
in California44 and one in Minnesota,45 plaintiffs successfully argued that their
crime-free housing ordinances violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because of the city-specific procedural requirements.46
The decisions both focused on a lack of sufficient notice from the police to the
landlord and insufficient time and opportunity to appeal.47 While the plaintiffs
in these cases were successful in striking down the crime-free housing ordinance
and winning their cases for lack of procedural due process, the city could always
provide more procedures—notice or opportunity to appeal—and the resulting
ordinances could be upheld. Therefore, this due process approach may be less
helpful in eradicating crime-free housing ordinances nationwide because
procedural deficiencies are easily remedied.48 Challenges on substantive due
process or equal protection grounds have not been fruitful; courts have either

40

Id.
Id.
42
Id.
43
See Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1184 (“To date, there have been relatively few court challenges to CHOs,
especially considering the number of ordinances that exist in municipalities across the country.”).
44
Cook v. City of Buena Park, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700, 701 (Cal. App. 4th 2005).
45
Javinsky-Wenzek v. City of St. Louis Park, 829 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790 (D. Minn. 2011).
46
See Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1184–85.
47
See id. at 1185–86; see also Victor Valley Family Res. Ctr. v. City of Hesperia, No. ED CV 16-00903AB (SPx), 2016 WL 3647340, at *5, *7 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2016) (enforcing an injunction against a city being
sued for its crime-free housing ordinance in part because the court found that there was no clear way for the
tenant to challenge the action before eviction, and “10 business days appear[ed] to be an insufficient amount of
time available to the tenant for notice and opportunity to be heard”).
48
Cf. City of Peoria v. Danz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100819-U, at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 1, 2011) (upholding
a crime-free housing ordinance that allowed thirty days for the landlord to take action, give proper notice, and
provide the tenant with an opportunity to appeal, which “stays enforcement of the ordinance until the hearing
officer determines whether there was sufficient evidence to require abatement or eviction”). This approach has
been useful in at least one case in preventing crime-free housing ordinances from affecting domestic violence
victims. See Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1186–87. See generally Danielle Panizzi, A Victim of Domestic Violence
a ‘Nuisance’ to Society?: How Chronic Nuisance Ordinances in Municipalities Impact Victims of Domestic
Violence, 39 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 146, 157 (2018) (describing how “[c]hronic nuisance ordinances often do
not provide the tenant faced with eviction the opportunity to object, a fundamental due process right”).
41
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decided the case on other grounds49 or held that the ordinance is not “sufficiently
irrational or outrageous to violate substantive due process.”50
Much of the scholarship on crime-free housing ordinances has mirrored
arguments that have been made in the few cases that have reached courts,
focusing on violations of due process and equal protection.51 In addition, recent
scholarship has looked at how the Fair Housing Act can be interpreted to apply
to private housing through disparate treatment, disparate impact, statutory
interpretation, and preemption.52 These articles have often focused on how
compulsory evictions affect minorities53 and domestic violence victims.54
There has been no significant effort to examine the use of the Fifth
Amendment to challenge crime-free housing ordinances.55 Part of the reason for
this gap may be due to the traditional “nuisance exception to the [F]ifth
[A]mendment just compensation requirement”56 that evolved in American

49
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1189 (citing Cook, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706). Ramsey does note, however,
that the concurring opinion indicates the judge’s potential receptivity to a substantive due process claim. Id. (“I
am concerned . . . about its sweeping requirement that all occupants of the premises must be evicted . . . its
disparate treatment of property owners and renters . . . and the Damoclean substantive due process issue which
hangs over this statutory scheme.” (quoting Cook, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 707) (Bedsworth, P.J., concurring))).
50
See id. (quoting Javinsky-Wenzek, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 801).
51
See Salim Katach, A Tenant’s Procedural Due Process Right in Chronic Nuisance Ordinance
Jurisdictions, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 875, 907–08 (2015) (arguing in favor of challenging nuisance ordinances on
procedural due process grounds); Panizzi, supra note 48, at 157 (describing how ordinances can violate Due
Process); Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1184–91 (describing possible challenges under procedural due process,
equal protection, and the Fair Housing Act). For a general discussion on the rise of third-party policing, such as
crime-free housing ordinances, see Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 825 (2015).
52
See Archer, supra note 29, at 217; Emily Werth, Stemming the Tide of Crime-Free Rental Housing and
Nuisance-Property Ordinances, 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y. 349, 350–52 (2014)
(describing the challenges of making a disparate impact claim under the FHA); Wroe, supra note 16, at 124.
53
See Archer, supra note 29, at 180; Rachel Smith, Policing Black Residents as Nuisances: Why Selective
Nuisance Law Enforcement Violates the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 87, 89 (2018).
For a discussion of the effects of nuisance ordinances on the disabled, see Alisha Jarwala & Sejal Singh, When
Disability Is a Nuisance: How Chronic Nuisance Ordinances Push Residents with Disabilities Out of Their
Homes, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 875, 878 (2019).
54
See Nicole Livanos, Crime-Free Housing Ordinances: One Call Away from Eviction, 19 PUB. INT. L.
REP. 106, 108–09 (2014); Panizzi, supra note 48, at 147; Katherine E. Walz, Protecting the Person and the
Home: Housing Law Responds to the Needs of Survivors of Violence, 44 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L.
& POL’Y 199, 199 (2010); Wroe, supra note 16, at 124–25; see also Werth, supra note 31, at 8–12 (analogizing
the harm to those who need police protection to domestic violence victims).
55
Bruce C. Fuchs did write an article examining housing codes, nuisance law, and takings. He argued
violations of housing codes that result in destruction of housing units and evictions of the tenants should result
in compensation to the tenants in light of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Devines v. Maier, 728 F.2d 876 (7th
Cir. 1984). See Bruce C. Fuchs, Eviction of the Residential Tenant as a Result of Housing Code Enforcement: A
Regulatory Taking Requiring Just Compensation, 12 CAP. U. L. REV. 481, 482 (1983). However, he did not
discuss crime-free housing ordinances as a housing code or otherwise. See id.
56
Fuchs, supra note 55, at 481.
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common law.57 Under this rule, any loss or change of property rights caused by
the government because of a violation of a nuisance law and a valid exercise of
the state’s police power could not be compensated under the Fifth Amendment.58
Therefore, any municipality could argue that because crime-free housing
ordinances were implemented to prevent nuisances such as criminal activities,
they are exempt from the Fifth Amendment.
However, this nuisance exception has been blurred through the Supreme
Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, like the cases described below59 such
as Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.60 In Lucas, the Supreme Court
created limits to a category of takings excluding only those nuisances founded
in the “background principles” of state law,61 and noted that only an “objectively
reasonable application” of those precedents could exclude compensation for a
taking.62 In doing so, the Supreme Court also changed the rule that all nuisance
laws are exempt from the Takings Clause and opened the door for challenges to
nuisance-like laws, like crime-free housing ordinances, under the Fifth
Amendment.63

57
See Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 149, 152
(2000) (“The notion that regulations restricting uses of property that generate harm to other property or to the
public interest do not trigger an obligation to compensate the regulated property owner . . . has deep roots in the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.”). For more on the evolution of nuisance law and takings law, see Carlos
A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 819, 821–22 (2006); Michael
J. Davis & Robert L. Glicksman, To the Promised Land: A Century of Wandering and a Final Homeland for the
Due Process and Taking Clauses, 68 OR. L. REV. 393, 394 (1989); John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of
Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1, 4 (1993).
58
Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) (“But acts done in the proper exercise of governmental
powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its use, are
universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision.”).
59
See, e.g., Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 395 (1922) (recognizing regulatory takings); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978) (creating a balancing test to determine if a regulatory taking
had occurred); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1982) (holding that any
permanent physical occupation of property qualifies as a taking, likely even if the law could be categorized as a
nuisance law); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987) (“[T]he public
interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances is a substantial one, which in many instances has not
required compensation.”).
60
Lucas v. S.C. Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992).
61
Id. at 1031 (“Instead, as it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action
for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that
prohibit the uses he now intends . . . .”).
62
Id. at 1032 n.18.
63
Glicksman, supra note 57, at 159 (“Apparently dispensing once and for all with a nuisance exception
from takings liability, the majority nevertheless, in virtually the same breath, reinjected the nuisance-like
character of the regulated property back into the takings equation.”).
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B. The Fifth Amendment and Takings
The Fifth Amendment was the first amendment from the Bill of Rights to be
incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment.64 The Amendment contains
many guarantees, including rights of criminal procedure, such as the protections
against double jeopardy and self-incrimination, and the right to due process.65
The last clause of the Fifth Amendment is the focus of this Comment. The text
of the Takings Clause states, “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”66
Despite the fact that “property” is mentioned three other times in the
Constitution—in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and in the Contracts Clause67—”[t]he Takings Clause is the most
important protection of property rights in the Constitution.”68 Courts have
interpreted the Takings Clause to prevent the government from taking property
from one citizen to give it to another.69 Instead, the Clause should be used to
spread losses, so that “[i]f the government takes away a person’s property to
benefit society, then society should pay,” instead of just the landowner.70
The types of possessory and regulatory takings and the tests the Supreme
Court has created to discern possessory and regulatory takings can be used to
determine whether a taking occurs from a compulsory eviction. This subsection
64
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 5th ed. 2017) (citing
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
65
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66
Id. The elements of a Fifth Amendment Takings Claim are (1) private property, (2) taken (3) for public
use, (4) without just compensation. Id.
67
Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 925, 937 n.81
(1989).
68
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 671. In her introduction to a symposium on regulatory takings, Judge
Loren A. Smith explained that the Takings Clause has increased in importance because the protections of
property that were available from aggressive maintenance of structural separation of powers and enumerated
powers have faded, as has the utility of the Contract Clause, the nondelegation doctrine, the Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to protect citizens from
government intrusion. Loren A. Smith, Introduction, 46 S.C. L. REV. 525, 527 (1995) (introducing an issue
focusing on regulatory takings). Those clauses of the Constitution “all have been abandoned by the courts as
real or viable limitations on government actions affecting economic relation[s],” and therefore “[o]nly the Fifth
Amendment’s Taking Clause retains any life.” Id.
69
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (“[I]t has long been accepted that the
sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even
though A is paid just compensation.”); see also Manheim, supra note 67, at 934 (“The [T]akings [C]lause applies
most directly to eminent domain, or where the state condemns private property and takes it for public use.”).
70
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 671; see, e.g., Quebedeaux v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 317, 320
(2013) (“The Takings Clause is designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))).
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explores the requirements of a constitutional taking: public use and just
compensation.
1. Types of Takings: Possessory and Regulatory
There are two main types of takings under the Fifth Amendment: possessory
and regulatory takings.71 A landlord or tenant must make a claim under one of
these.72 Possessory takings are classic government takings that are restricted by
the most straightforward reading of the Takings Clause. They involve
government seizure of real property.73 Regulatory takings, however, occur when
“the government is claimed to have taken property rights not by outright seizure
or occupation, but by regulation.”74 This subsection explains the two types of
takings that could apply to evictions under crime-free housing ordinances.
a. Traditional Possessory Takings
In a traditional possessory taking, the government takes possession and title
of property for the public benefit.75 As the Court explained in Stop the Beach
Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, possessory
takings are the “classic” type of taking, in which there “is a transfer of property
to the State or to another private party by eminent domain.”76 Possessory takings
are confined to this specific scenario of physical appropriation of private77 or
real property by the government78 and have therefore spawned less controversy
than regulatory takings in recent years.79 Any controversies usually rest on
whether the property is being utilized for public use,80 and whether

71

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 671–72.
Id.
73
See id. (“A possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies
property.”).
74
Smith, supra note 68, at 527.
75
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 672 (“A ‘regulatory’ taking occurs when the government’s
regulation leaves no reasonably economically viable use of the property.”).
76
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713 (2010).
77
See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 358 (2015) (holding that the Fifth Amendment applies to
personal property as well).
78
Josh Patashnik, Physical Takings, Regulatory Takings, and Water Rights, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
365, 365 (2011).
79
See Horne, 576 U.S. at 358 (“There is no dispute that the ‘classic taking [is one] in which the
government directly appropriates private property for its own use.’” (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002))).
80
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (deciding “whether a city’s decision
to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the ‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth
Amendment”).
72
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compensation is just.81 In June 2019, the Court overturned its previous decision
in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City82 and held that plaintiffs do not need to exhaust state procedures
before seeking federal relief for an unconstitutional taking.83 Therefore, a
challenger of a crime-free housing ordinance would be able to sue in federal
court, as soon as he or she experiences government action.

b. Regulatory Takings
While possessory takings are more straightforward to define, the Court has
never established a bright-line test to determine when government regulation of
property reaches the level of a regulatory taking.84 On the most basic level,
“[e]conomic regulation in all forms invariably affects property rights.”85 For
example, the requirement that a landlord provide habitable living conditions for
his or her tenants affects his or her ability to use the property because he or she
has to spend time and money complying with government standards. However,
the Court has also acknowledged that the government should not have to
reimburse property owners for every statute or regulation passed that changes
their property’s value.86 The question that has flummoxed courts for almost 100
years since the landmark case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon is how to
determine when the diminution of a person’s property caused by state police
power crosses over into a regulatory taking.87
In Pennsylvania Coal Co., “the progenitor of modern takings
jurisprudence,”88 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, “The general rule at
least is[] that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”89 In that case, the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute that prohibited coal mining when it would cause damage to
a house because, in doing so, the statute invalidated a deed for mineral rights
that contained a waiver of all damages caused on the surface.90 Instead, the Court
81
See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 489 (1973) (considering whether the fair market value
of condemned lands should include the value of government permits to graze on the land).
82
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
83
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2019).
84
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 671.
85
Manheim, supra note 67, at 934.
86
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government could hardly go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”).
87
Cf. A. Dan Tarlock, Regulatory Takings, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 24 (1984) (“The question ‘what is
a taking?’ can be more accurately stated as ‘when is the exercise of the police power invalid?’”).
88
Manheim, supra note 67, at 935.
89
Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
90
Id. at 412–14.
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held that the regulation resulted in a public taking of purchased mineral rights
and would require just compensation to the owner of those rights.91
While the Supreme Court has not created a “formula” for assessing when a
regulatory taking has occurred, it has created a three different tests.92 First, in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court noted that when the
government enacts “a permanent physical occupation of property, [the Court’s]
cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation,” regardless
of any other factors.93 The Court concluded that whenever a physical occupation
occurs by government action, the question is not whether a taking has occurred,
but rather what compensation is owed due to the nature of the occupation.94 It
does not matter how small the government intrusion is, so long as there is a
physical invasion of the property.95
Second, government regulations violate the Fifth Amendment when they
prohibit all economic use of the property.96 However, the Court added a caveat
to this per se rule. The prohibited economic use must have been part of the
owner’s understood rights to begin with and could not have been prohibited by
“background principles of nuisance and property law” that “independently
restrict the owner’s intended use of the property.”97 Once the landowner has
established that all economic use has been prohibited by the taking, it is up to
the state to prove that it has the authority to institute the regulation through “the
land’s title or by nuisance law.”98

91

Id. at 415.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (describing the two bright line tests
that do not require ad hoc balancing like all other regulatory taking cases).
93
458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982); see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (“The first encompasses regulations that compel
the property owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property.”).
94
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437.
95
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (explaining the significance of the Court’s ruling in Loretto). Erwin
Chemerinsky classifies Loretto as an example of a possessory taking, which is not inaccurate as there is some
disagreement among sources. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 672; see also Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713 (2010) (“Similarly, our doctrine of regulatory takings ‘aims
to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking.’” (citation omitted)); Horne
v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 357 (2015) (“There is no dispute that the ‘classic taking [is one] in which the
government directly appropriates private property for its own use.’” (citation omitted)). For the sake of clarity,
I have chosen to separate the Loretto-type takings from traditional possessory takings even though they could
also be characterized as a possessory taking.
96
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 679–80; Joseph William Singer,
Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 601, 632 (2015) (explaining the per se rule against
regulations that deprive owners of all economic use of their property).
97
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026–32).
98
Terry D. Morgan, Takings Law: Strategies for Dealing with Lucas, 45 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3,
4 (1993).
92
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Finally, the third test applies to any regulation that does not go so far as to
take away all economically beneficial use of a property, but still goes “too far.”99
The Court will discern this type of taking through factor balancing, paying
special attention to “three factors which have ‘particular significance’: (1) the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the
character of the governmental action.”100
One notable recent case had the potential to change how the Court evaluated
regulatory takings, and therefore crime-free housing ordinances, but did not
garner enough votes for a majority opinion.101 While the disposition in Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection
rejected a takings claim by shorefront landowners in Florida, four justices joined
the plurality and two justices wrote separate concurrences each joined by the
other justice.102 In a plurality opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the
Court held that the “Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property
without paying for it” and, therefore, a taking can be done by any branch of
government, including the judicial branch.103 More relevant to the debate
surrounding crime-free housing ordinances, Justice Scalia created a new type of
regulatory taking when “states . . . recharacterize as public property what was
previously private property.”104 While this new category of regulatory takings
drew much attention from scholars,105 it was in a plurality opinion and therefore
holds no precedential weight.106 The decision might, however, indicate a
pending shift in the Court’s takings jurisprudence107 that would likely be very
beneficial to tenants and landlords challenging crime-free housing ordinances.108
99

See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224–25 (1986); see, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978); Singer, supra note 96, at 631.
101
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
102
Id. at 707, 733, 742. Justice John Paul Stevens did not participate in the decision.
103
Id. at 715.
104
Id. at 713.
105
See, e.g., Lora A. Lucero et. al., Stop the Beach Renourishment—Six Perspectives, 62 PLAN. & ENV’T
L. 3, 3 (2010); Singer, supra note 96, at 601; Eduardo Peñalver & Lior Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due
Process? 1 (John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 549, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791849.
106
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987) (“As the plurality opinion in MITE did
not represent the views of a majority of the Court, we are not bound by its reasoning.”).
107
If the issue was brought up to the Supreme Court again, the result might be different with the current
makeup of the Supreme Court and the addition of conservative members.
108
Beyond establishing the three tests, later cases were significant in establishing how regulatory takings
apply to zoning ordinances. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. was the first case to hold that zoning
ordinances that greatly decreased the value of property were not automatically regulatory takings and did not go
“too far” under the Mahon standard. 272 U.S. 365, 395–97 (1926); see Tarlock, supra note 87 (“The great case
100
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Because crime-free housing ordinances only developed in the past thirty
years,109 landlords and tenants could argue that the state has engaged in a
regulatory taking by recharacterizing their formerly private property right—to
transfer their property to whomever they pleased110—as a public right for
municipal governments to determine through crime-free housing ordinances.
2. The Public Use Requirement
The Fifth Amendment allows possessory and regulatory takings for public
use only.111 Therefore, any municipality attempting to take property under a
crime-free housing ordinance would have to show it was for a public purpose.
The Supreme Court has held that the government cannot take private property
and give it to another person if there is no underlying purpose to benefit the
public.112 The Court seemed to push this requirement to its limit in the
controversial case Kelo v. City of New London.113 In that case, the City of New
London authorized a private corporation to purchase property or use eminent
domain in the city’s name for a new factory.114 The stated public purpose was
“economic revitalization.”115 The Court upheld the taking because “promoting
economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of
government.”116 In doing so, the Court established that it will give great

of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. answered the question: is a comprehensive zoning ordinance
constitutional?”). The Court held that reasonable zoning ordinances are constitutional. Id.; see Euclid, 272 U.S.
at 379 (“[B]efore [a] zoning ordinance can be declared unconstitutional,” it must be said that its “provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.”). In a later and very famous case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court upheld
a refusal by a zoning commission to allow the company that owned Grand Central Station to build a fifty-story
office building on top of the station. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). Because the zoning restriction was “substantially
related to the promotion of the general welfare” and “reasonable beneficial use” of the property was still possible
without permitting the construction, there was no taking. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 708. The Court noted
that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. In
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court also held that property owners could challenge a regulation under the Fifth
Amendment even if the regulation was in place when the property owner bought the property in question. 533
U.S. 606, 628–32 (2001).
109
See Ramsey, supra note 15.
110
See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
111
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 708.
112
Id. (citing Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281
U.S. 439, 446–47 (1930); Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896)).
113
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
114
Id. at 472.
115
Id. at 473.
116
Id. at 484.
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deference to any stated public purpose and that “virtually any taking will meet
the requirement [for public use].”117
3. The Just Compensation Requirement
If a court held that eviction under a crime-free housing ordinance was a
taking for public use, the state municipality would only be able to take the
landlord or tenant’s property after paying “just compensation.”118 The final two
words of the Fifth Amendment embody this requirement.119 A court determines
just compensation based on the loss to the property owner rather than on the
value of the property to the government.120 The loss is measured by the market
value of the property at the time of the taking, and it does not include any
increase in property value that occurs once the pendency of the government
taking is revealed.121 If the tenant or landlord subject to a crime-free housing
ordinance was successful in their constitutional takings claim, the state would
owe them just compensation for the entire time the government seized the
property, including during the court proceedings.122
Crime-free housing ordinances are relatively new regulatory inventions that
began proliferating in different parts of the country over the last few decades.123
Fifth Amendment takings law, however, has been developing since the 1800s
and continues to evolve with each new Supreme Court term.124 The next Part
applies the Court’s evolving regulatory takings jurisprudence to evictions caused
by crime-free housing ordinances.

117

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 708.
Id. at 718 (“The Constitution clearly envisions that the government will take private property for public
use, but it requires that the government pay for it. The standard of payment is ‘just compensation.’”).
119
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
120
See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 235–36 (2003) (“All of the Circuit Judges and District
Judges who have confronted the compensation question, both in this case and in Phillips, have agreed that the
‘just compensation’ required by the Fifth Amendment is measured by the property owner’s loss rather than the
government’s gain.”); Bos. Chamber of Com. v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) (“And the question is what
has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.”).
121
See CHEMERINSKY supra note 64, at 719.
122
See id. (citing First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304
(1987)).
123
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1151.
124
See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
118
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II. COMPULSORY EVICTIONS UNDER CRIME-FREE HOUSING ORDINANCES
VIOLATE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
To establish whether compulsory evictions under crime-free housing
ordinances violate the Fifth Amendment, this Part applies the constitutional
requirements for a takings claim to the enforcement of a crime-free housing
ordinance. A Fifth Amendment takings claim requires private property that is
taken for public use, without just compensation.125 This Part primarily focuses
on whether a taking has occurred in the case of a compulsory eviction. In the
case of crime-free housing ordinances, there has been no compensation by the
government to landlords or tenants, so section C focuses on what just
compensation would be if a court held that compulsory evictions were takings.
In compulsory evictions, two parties, the landlord and the tenant, are
potentially being deprived of their respective property interests by the
government.126 First, the landlord loses a tenant and a revenue stream and must
put the property back on the market for a new renter.127 The next section
examines if the ability to select one’s own tenant and transfer property as desired
is a constitutionally protected property interest. Second, the tenant loses his or
her leasehold interest in the property.128 The leaseholder has even greater interest
in the property if the leasehold includes a real estate installment contract as in
Barron.129 This section likewise explores leasehold interests as property in the
age of the increasing applicability of contract law to relations between a landlord
and tenant.
After establishing that the landlord and tenant have property interests in the
land that is subject to crime-free housing ordinances, section B discusses
whether property is actually taken during a compulsory eviction from the
landlord or the lessee, either through a possessory taking or a regulatory

125

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See, e.g., Cook v. City of Buena Park, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700, 701 (Cal. App. 4th, 2005) (detailing where
the landlord affected by a crime-free housing ordinance sued the city); Complaint, supra note 1, at 27 (arguing
that the crime-free housing ordinance has deprived the tenants of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
127
See Cook, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 704 (noting that the landlord has a property interest “in collecting rent
under the lease with the tenant, and in avoiding the lien provision and fines imposed by the ordinance” and is
detrimentally affected by having to pay the costs of the “eviction proceedings”).
128
See Werth, supra note 31, at 12 (“Eviction is a highly disruptive event that can have serious detrimental
consequences for families.”).
129
Complaint, supra note 1, at 4; Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14 (“Installment land
contract. A contract for the sale of land providing that the buyer will receive immediate possession of the land
and pay the purchase price in installments over time, but that the seller will retain legal title until all payments
are made.”).
126
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taking.130 It discusses the characteristics of the government action in compulsory
evictions under crime-free housing ordinances in light of possessory and
regulatory takings doctrines that have been recognized by the Court. Lastly, the
third and fourth elements of a taking, the public use and just compensation
requirements, are applied to compulsory evictions.
A. The Property Rights of a Landlord and Tenant
For the Fifth Amendment to apply, a plaintiff first must prove that he or she
has a compensable property interest.131 Property “includes every valuable
interest which can be enjoyed and recognized as property, including the rights
inherent in ownership, the right to possess, use and enjoy, sell or assign, transfer
or otherwise dispose of the property, as well as the right to exclude from the
property.”132 The Court has specified that “[t]he Constitution protects these
essential attributes of property.”133 This section argues that the right of
transferability is a property right owned by the landlord and the right to a possess
a leasehold is a property right owned by the tenant.
1. The Ability to Lease to Whomever One Chooses Is a Property Right
When a landlord rents out his or her property under common law, the
landlord has transferred his or her property interest to the lessor.134 The ability
to transfer, sell, or assign property—the alienability of property—is protected
under the Fifth Amendment because it is one of the “valuable
interest[s] . . . inherent in ownership.”135 Choosing to whom to transfer the
property and for how long is part of the liberty interest of full alienation of
property.136 Alienability is such an important property right that ambiguous

130
See Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]f the
court concludes that a cognizable property interest exists, it [next] determines whether that property interest was
‘taken.’”).
131
John Bourdeau, Lonnie E. Griffith, Jr., Alan J. Jacobs, Sonja Larsen, William Lindsley & Paul
Steinberg, Compensable Property and Rights, Generally, in 29A C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN § 72 (2020).
132
Id.
133
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215 (1923).
134
See In re Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 444 B.R. 263, 270–71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (“A lease is a
contract that provides exclusive possession of premises.”).
135
Bourdeau et al., supra note 131.
136
See, e.g., Shvartser v. Lekser, 308 F. Supp. 3d 260, 267 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Inherent in ownership of
property is the right to dispose of the property as one chooses.”); EZ Pawn Corp. v. City of New York, 390 F.
Supp. 3d 403, 422 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“An individual’s interest in property includes . . . ‘the right to exclude
others from possessing it, the right to use it and receive income from its use, the right to transmit it to another,
and the right to sell, alienate, waste, or even destroy it.’” (quoting Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778, 788 (2d Cir.
2009))).
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statutes are generally read to avoid hindering it.137 Therefore, a landlord in a
crime-free housing jurisdiction has a property right that is subject to a taking
under the Fifth Amendment.
2. A Leasehold Is a Property Right Protected Under the Fifth Amendment
A leasehold is a property interest.138 The original leasehold estate developed
from feudal property law in an agrarian society, in which the value of the land
was “the land itself,”139 and the landlord did not guarantee any quality or
maintenance of the property during the leasehold.140 However, beginning in the
mid-1900s, judges and scholars started changing how they framed the duties and
obligations of landlords and tenants from property law to contract law.141 Courts
started adapting the warranty of merchantability—a principle of contracts142—
to the property rented by the landlord by enforcing the warrant of habitability143
and legalizing constructive eviction.144 Leaseholds have become a combination
of contract and property law, as certain rights and obligations are in privity with
the estate and run with the land, and others are in privity with the contract and
can be assigned by sublease.145
Why does the increasing use of contract law to govern leaseholds matter to
an examination of the legality of crime-free housing ordinances under the Fifth
Amendment? Because if courts completely change their conception of
137
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Douglass, 14 S.W. 604, 605 (1890) (“The law favors full alienation of property,
and abhors perpetuities.”).
138
See Reese v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 685 S.E.2d 34, 41 (2009) (“A leasehold is an interest in land[.]”);
Turntable Fishery & Moorage Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 256, 261 (2002) (“A leasehold interest is a
property interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”).
139
Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
140
Clarence Clinton Davis Jr., Recognition of an Implied Covenant of Habitability in Residential
Leaseholds: Kamarath v. Bennett, 32 SW. L.J. 1037, 1037–38 (1978).
141
See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075 n.11 (listing court cases and scholarship about combining contract and
property law for modern leaseholds).
142
Watson Quality Ford, Inc. v. Casanova, 999 So. 2d 830, 833 (Miss. 2008) (“The implied warranty of
merchantability provides that, ‘[w]hen a sale of goods is made, there is an implied warranty that the goods are
merchantable if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.’” (quoting Vince v. Broome, 443 So.
2d 23, 26 (Miss. 1983))).
143
See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1076–77.
144
See id. at 1078 n.38 (describing cases that adopted a version of constructive eviction).
145
See CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, PROPERTY: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND SKILLS 213 (Erwin Chemerinsky et. al.
eds., 2016) (“Those who hold consecutive possessory interests in the same property are said to be in privity of
estate with one another—such as a tenant . . . and a landlord . . . . Landlord and tenant are also in privity of
contract because both are parties to the lease agreement and are bound by the promises contained therein.”); W.
F. Woodruff, Lessor or Lessee: Parties to a Contract or Landlord and Tenant, 8 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REV. 35,
46 (1939) (“What is the lease of today? . . . [I]s it an estate in land or is it a contract? The only conclusion that
we have been able to reach is that it is neither, but both.”).
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leaseholds to one of contract and remove the property interest of the lessee from
the leasehold, the question of whether there is a taking of a leasehold would be
based in contract law rather than property law.146 However, such a claim might
still be governed by the Fifth Amendment.147
Freedom of contract has been recognized as a personal liberty and property
interest, and “included in the right of personal liberty and the right to private
property is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property.”148
Therefore, if property law was separated from the leasehold estate, a claim
against government authority to require a contractual addendum in a leasehold
could arise under the Fifth Amendment as an unconstitutional restraint of the
right to contract. Unlike the right of property, freedom of contract has not been
universally accepted as a fundamental right and is subject to greater
regulation.149 A claim under the Fifth Amendment for a violation of the freedom
of contract might be less likely to succeed than a claim for a violation of the right
of property.150
While the transition to contract rights may become total as modern property
law advances, property interests remain in tenant law today.151 Regardless of
whether the right to contract is inherent in the right to property, the law still
recognizes a leasehold as a property right.152 Therefore, a lessee in a crime-free
146
Cf. Davis Jr., supra note 140, at 1040 n.32 (“[A] question remains as to how far the courts will
eventually go in replacing older, more rigid property law principles with current contract doctrines.”).
147
16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 640 (2019).
148
Id.
149
Compare Blount v. Smith, 231 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ohio 1967) (“The right to contract freely with the
expectation that the contract shall endure according to its terms is as fundamental to our society as the right to
write and to speak without restraint.”); Alford v. Textile Ins. Co., 103 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1958) (“In an
examination of the 1947 Act . . . we must bear in mind the fundamental rights of free men to contract.”); and
Fla. Accts. Ass’n v. Dandelake, 98 So. 2d 323, 327 (Fla. 1957) (“Nor can we overlook the fundamental right of
all citizens to enter into contracts of personal employment.”), with Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. McGuire,
219 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1911) (“The right to make contracts is subject to the exercise of the powers granted to
Congress for the suitable conduct of matters of national concern; as, for example, the regulation of commerce
with foreign nations and among the several states.”); Westlake Vinyls, Inc. v. Goodrich Corp., 518 F. Supp. 2d
947, 953 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (“In general, parties have complete freedom to enter into a contract; however, that
freedom is limited by public policy reasons.”); Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Tex. 2016)
(“As a general rule, parties in Texas may contract as they wish so long as the agreement reached does not violate
positive law or offend public policy.”); and State v. Gateway Mortuaries, 87 Mont. 225, 238 (1930) (“The liberty
of contract yields readily to any of the acknowledged purposes of the police power, and it differs from
fundamental constitutional rights . . . in that it is neither a vested right, nor right of definite content, nor a right
protected by special constitutional guarantees.” (quoting ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 499 (1904))).
150
See, e.g., Gateway Mortuaries, 87 Mont. at 238 (quoting FREUND, supra note 149).
151
One argument against removing property interests from the leasehold could be that it would remove
the constitutional safeguards regarding property rights from leaseholders.
152
See, e.g., Cross Continent Dev., LLC v. Town of Akron, Colo., 742 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184 (D. Colo.
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housing jurisdiction does have a property interest that is subject to a taking under
the Fifth Amendment.
B. There Has Been a Taking for the Tenant, but Not the Landlord, Under a
Crime-free Housing Ordinance
This section applies possessory and regulatory takings law to establish
whether the landlord or tenant has suffered a taking after enforcement of a crimefree housing ordinance. To determine if there is a traditional possessory taking,
this section examines whether the government has transferred the property from
a private person to itself or a different private person.153 To determine if there is
a regulatory taking, this section applies the three tests described in Supreme
Court precedent.154 If the taking (1) includes a “physical invasion” onto the
property or (2) forbids all economic use of the land (keeping in mind the Lucas
caveat),155 it is a per se regulatory taking.156 If the taking does not fall into either
of these categories, the Court engages in (3) an ad hoc balancing test, including
the three factors of significance,157 to determine if the regulation went “too far”
and became a taking.158 The analysis argues that there has been both a possessory
and regulatory taking for the tenant after a compulsory eviction under a crimefree housing ordinance.
1. Compulsory Eviction Under Crime-free Housing Ordinances Qualifies
as a Possessory Taking for the Tenant but Not for the Landlord
In the case of a compulsory eviction, there is no possessory taking for the
landlord because the landlord still retains control over his or her property.
However, there is a possessory taking for the tenant because the tenant is
stripped of all his or her property rights in the leasehold estate after eviction
under a crime-free housing ordinance.

2010) (“As a general proposition, a leasehold interest is property, the taking of which entitles the leaseholder to
just compensation for value thereof.” (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (1978))).
153
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713 (2010).
154
See supra Part I.B.1.b.
155
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
156
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982); Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026–1032).
157
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224–25 (1986).
158
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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a. The Landlord’s Property Has Not Been Taken
The question of whether there has been a traditional possessory taking for
the landlord is easier to answer than for the tenant. The Court has defined a
possessory taking as transferring property from one party and giving it to
another.159 Eminent domain—when the government takes property from a
private individual—“resemble[s] forced sales by which property title actually
passes to the government”160 and has roots in traditional common law.161 What
is encompassed in property title? According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “title”
is “[t]he union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody)
constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property.”162 Possession and
title are different, “although whoever has title either has possession or has a right
that is superior to the person who has possession (such as the title of the landlord
and the possession of the tenant).”163
There is no traditional possessory taking when a landlord is forced to evict
his or her tenant because the landlord does not have to transfer his or her title to
the government.164 During a compulsory eviction under a crime-free housing
ordinance, the municipality forces a transfer of the tenant’s current possessory
property rights back to the landlord165 through compulsory eviction of the
tenant.166 The landlord’s own interest in the land is not transferred to someone
else.167 When the landlord has a tenant in place, he or she has a reversionary
interest after the end of the leasehold.168 The landlord still owns his or her land,
but after a tenant violates the crime-free housing ordinance, the government
forces the landlord to evict his or her tenant.169 The landlord’s interest may have
159

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713 (2010).
KLEIN, supra note 145, at 688.
161
See id.
162
Title, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14.
163
Title, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012).
164
See KLEIN, supra note 145, at 688 (defining eminent domain as the transfer of property title to the
government).
165
See id. at 192 (discussing how leaseholds are “a nonfreehold present estate that could be followed by
a reversion in the grantor”).
166
Eviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14 (“The act or process of legally dispossessing a
person of land or rental property.”) If the tenant is legally dispossessed of the rental property, the property returns
to the landlord.
167
Cf. Werth, supra note 31, at 4 (describing how “crime free rental housing ordinances impose a series
of mandatory actions and accompanying penalties for non-compliance on landlords” but do involve government
takeover of the landlord’s property).
168
Klein, supra note 145, at 192 (“[T]he tenant has a present right to present possession, and the landlord
holds a present right to future possession (a reversion) that takes effect upon the termination of the leasehold.”).
169
Cf. Werth, supra note 31, at 3 (describing how crime-free housing ordinances usually require the
landlord to evict the tenant or apply strong incentives to encourage the landlord to do so).
160
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changed because the landlord no longer has a reversionary interest, and instead
has a present interest, but the landlord’s physical property has not been
transferred to someone else. While in previous cases courts have held that
landlords are entitled to compensation for lost payments for leaseholds when the
government takes the landlord’s land,170 those cases are distinguishable. In such
possessory takings cases, the landlord lost all property title and rights to his or
her property and could not find another tenant because the government became
either the leaseholder or the permanent owner.171 Under a crime-free housing
ordinance eviction, after the landlord evicts the tenant, the landlord can still find
another tenant to occupy his or her land (as long as the landlord has not lost his
or her license).172
b. The Tenant’s Property Has Been Taken
If eminent domain solely applies to takings in which actual property title is
passed to the government, tenants evicted under crime-free housing ordinances
would be unable to recover under a traditional possessory takings theory because
they are not property title owners.173 After a compulsory eviction under a crimefree housing ordinance, the tenant’s current possessory rights, not the property
title, are returned to the landlord.174
However, the courts have not limited their understanding of eminent domain
to property title alone.175 Courts do award compensation to leaseholders who
lose their interest in land after the government takes it through eminent

170
See, e.g., Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976) (holding that the government
must compensate for “the fair rental value of the possessory interest transferred by the lease” and the “full value
of the reversionary interest that is subject to the outstanding lease, plus, of course, the value of the rental rights
under the lease” (emphasis added)).
171
Cf. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374 (1946) (reciting where a landlord arranged for
the government to gain access to the “totality of [the] property” during the government’s forced leasehold);
Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 342 (1927) (describing a government requisition and creation of a
leasehold in which the government maintained full control of the property).
172
Loss of license is a common penalty for failure to heed the ordinance. Werth, supra note 31, at 4.
173
See Title, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 163; see also Tenancy,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14 (“1. The possession or occupancy of land under a lease; a leasehold
interest in real estate. 2. The period of such possession or occupancy.”).
174
See Title, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 163 (explaining that because
the tenant does not have property title and the landlord does, the landlord has a superior right to the property).
175
See Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 380 (“Upon a new trial, each tenant . . . should be permitted to prove
damages for the condemnation of its rights for any remainder of its term which existed after its ouster by the
order of possession but not costs of moving or relocation.”); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
384 (1945) (“[T]he tenant whose occupancy is taken is entitled to compensation for destruction, damage or
depreciation in value.”).
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domain.176 As long as there has been no waiver of all rights to compensation
upon condemnation,177 “a tenant occupying property under a written lease for a
definite and unexpired term, acquired prior to the commencement of the
condemnation proceedings, is entitled to treatment as an ‘owner’ whose interests
in the property are to be protected under applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.”178 The Supreme Court has held that after a taking of a leasehold
interest, the tenant must be reimbursed for the fair market value of the use of the
property for the rest of the leasehold and the “value of the right to renew” minus
the “agreed rent which the tenant would pay for such use and occupancy.”179
After a tenant violates a crime-free housing ordinance, the tenant must leave
his or her property and forfeit his or her current possessory rights to the
property.180 The tenant’s property is not being confiscated by the government
because it is evidence or has been paid for through the proceeds of the tenant’s
crime, as occurs legally through civil asset forfeiture.181 As noted in Barron, the
tenants themselves may not have committed a crime at all.182 Instead, the
eviction is a government taking.

176
See Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976) (“It has long been established that
the holder of an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled, under the Fifth Amendment, to just compensation
for the value of that interest when it is taken upon condemnation by the United States.”); A. W. Duckett & Co.
v. United States, 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924) (holding that the government was required to compensate a lessee
who had a leasehold in the condemned property); In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc. 287 B.R. 112, 120 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized the basic economic point, and ruled as a consequence
that a tenant’s interest in the economic value of a lease is property capable of being protected under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution.”); see also Alan N. Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA.
L. REV. 477, 479 (1962) (“The heart of any examination of condemnation involving a leasehold interest centers
around the determination of the total compensation to be awarded for the fragmented interests and the methods
for determining the respective interests of lessor and lessee.”).
177
Leases can have clauses that clarify the lessee’s right if there is a possessory taking by the government
under eminent domain. See Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 376 (“The Tool Company had contracted away any
rights that it might otherwise have had. . . . With this type of clause . . . the tenant has no right which persists
beyond the taking and can be entitled to nothing.”); Polasky, supra note 176, at 481 (“Of somewhat greater
importance is the effect of a clause in the lease modifying the lessee’s rights to participate in the proceeding and
in any award.”). Without such a provision, the lessee “is still regarded as an ‘owner’ with correlative rights of
notice, opportunity for appropriate participation in the proceeding . . . and . . . for determination of his separate
interest.” Id. at 481–82.
178
See Polasky, supra note 176, at 479; see also id. at 479 n.12 (finding other cases supporting this idea).
179
See Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 380–81.
180
See Eviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14 (“The act or process of legally dispossessing
a person of land or rental property.”); Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1149 (“[T]he result of a violation is usually
either an eviction action against the tenant or fines levied against the landlord.”).
181
Ellen Zimiles & Rachel Sazanowicz, Defending Clients in Forfeiture Actions, in DEFENDING
CORPORATIONS & INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS § 17.2 (Daniel J. Fetterman & Mark P.
Goodman eds., 2020).
182
Complaint, supra note 1, at 12.
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Eviction after the violation of a crime-free housing ordinance differs from a
normal leasehold condemnation proceeding. The land does not transfer from the
tenant to the government.183 Instead, the government forces the landlord to take
private property from the tenant through compulsory eviction.184 The land title
does not exchange hands.185 In past cases involving government takings of
property for a specific amount of time, the government completely took the
property for a term of years and the landlord did not retain title like in a normal
leasehold between private persons.186
However, this difference between traditional leasehold takings and
compulsory evictions under crime-free housing ordinances can be reconciled
through the state action doctrine. “State action” is defined as “[a]nything done
by a government; esp., in constitutional law, an intrusion on a person’s rights
(esp. civil rights) either by a governmental entity or by a private requirement
that can be enforced only by governmental action (such as a racially restrictive
covenant, which requires judicial action for enforcement).”187 Here, crime-free
housing ordinances are private requirements that are enforced through the
government action of penalties. While state action questions usually arise in due
process and equal protection cases,188 the very definition of a taking189—and its
later incorporation190—means that state action is required to successfully sue
under the Fifth Amendment.191
The Second Circuit has emphasized, “To establish a Fifth Amendment
violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘that in denying the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, the defendant’s conduct constituted state action.’”192 While
183
Contra Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 342 (1927) (reciting where the government requisitioned
property for a specific term of years to utilize during wartime and the land was transferred from the tenant to the
government).
184
See id.
185
Cf. Werth, supra note 31, at 4 (describing how crime-free housing ordinances require the landlord to
evict the tenant or face civil fines, revocation of a rental license, or an injunction against renting).
186
See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374 (1946).
187
State Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14.
188
See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (“Our ‘involuntary confession’ jurisprudence is
entirely consistent with the settled law requiring some sort of ‘state action’ to support a claim of violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); State Action, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 163 (focusing on the Civil Rights Cases and 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
189
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 670 (defining eminent domain as “the
authority to take private property when necessary for government activities”).
190
See Chi., Burlington & Quincy. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (incorporating the Fifth
Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
191
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
192
D. L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regul., Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Desiderio
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999))).
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“the fact that a business entity is subject to ‘extensive and detailed’ state
regulation does not convert that organization’s actions into those of the state,”193
federal courts have also acknowledged that private actions can be classified as
state action if they are “fairly attributable” to the state.194 The Supreme Court
has established a test to determine when a private action can be considered a
state action.195 There has to be a “close nexus” between the state and the action
in question, “so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.”196 The state must have exerted so much power over the private party
“or provided such significant encouragement, overt or covert, that the choice
must in law be deemed to be that of the State.”197
The eviction of a party under a crime-free housing ordinance is “fairly
attributable”198 to the state. While the landlord is the party implementing the
eviction, the state itself is responsible for the eviction because it forces the
landlord to strip the tenant of his or her property rights. In some cases, like
Barron,199 the landlord may not want to evict his or her tenant for a violation of
a mandatory lease addendum but may be forced to by the state. In other cases,
the police will deliver a letter by hand to the landlord demanding that the
landlord evict his or her tenants.200 If the state is serving eviction notices or
forcing compliance through fines and penalties,201 the state is responsible for the

193

Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 206 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974))).
Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
195
See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003–04 (1982).
196
Id. (quoting Jackson, 457 U.S. at 351); see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (“Thus, we say that state action may be found if, though only if, there is such
a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated
as that of the State itself.’” (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351))).
197
Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004. The Court also identifies a third factor that may indicate the existence of the
“required nexus” between the private and state actor—if the “‘private entity has exercised powers that are
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’” Id. at 1005. However, this third factor is not present for
crime-free housing ordinances as evictions were not traditionally carried out by the state alone and is not
dispositive. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295–96 (“From the range of circumstances that could point toward
the State behind an individual face, no one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board for finding
state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient.”).
198
Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 206 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982))).
199
See J. Justin Wilson, Illinois Family Sues to End Law Threatening Them with Compulsory Eviction for
a Crime They Did Not Commit, INST. JUST. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://ij.org/press-release/illinois-family-sues-toend-law-threatening-them-with-compulsory-eviction-for-a-crime-they-did-not-commit/.
200
J. Justin Wilson, First Round Victory in Challenge to Compulsory-Eviction Law, INST. JUST. (Oct. 24,
2019), https://ij.org/press-release/first-round-victory-in-challenge-to-compulsory-eviction-law/ (“Three officers
personally served their landlord with a formal demand ‘that an eviction notice be served and the eviction process
initiated.’ And last week, the city served yet another notice, again ordering that their landlord ‘must begin
eviction proceedings.’”).
201
See Werth, supra note 31, at 4 (“Common penalties include civil fines and injunctions against renting
out the property.”).
194
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private party action.202 That same state behavior fulfills the requirement to prove
a “close nexus” between the state and public action because the state has
provided sufficient encouragement and power over the private property through
fines and threats of legal action that the “choice . . . in law”203 belongs to the
state.204 Eviction under crime-free housing ordinances stands in contrast to other
private party action that the Supreme Court has not regarded as state action205
because the landlord’s hand is being forced by the state, and he or she is unable
to act according to his or her own independent judgment.206
Even though property is not transferred directly to the government after an
eviction under a crime-free housing ordinance, the transfer of property from the
tenant to the landlord would still qualify as a government taking. In Kelo v. City
of New London, the Supreme Court held that other entities could exert the state’s
eminent domain power.207 The Court’s 2005 decision upheld the delegation of
eminent domain power from a municipality to a private nonprofit.208 That private
nonprofit then exercised that power to take property from one person to give the
property to another private person.209 The government is doing something
similar by enforcing crime-free housing ordinances. It delegates takings power
to the landlord to carry out its mandatory evictions and then requires the landlord
to retake the tenant’s property rights, so the landlord can then rent, transfer, or

202
See, e.g., Complaint at 25, Brumit v. City of Granite, No. 3:19-cv-1090 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2019)
(“Because Clayton Baker would not terminate Debi and Andy’s lease at 7 Briarcliff Drive but for Granite City’s
command that he do so, Granite City’s command will be the sole cause of the destruction of Debi and Andy’s
property interest in 7 Briarcliff Drive.”).
203
Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 206 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982)); see also Blum,
457 U.S. at 1004 (“[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised
coercive power . . . .”).
204
See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
205
Id. at 1005 (holding that nurses and doctors using their independent judgment to change a patient’s
Medicare-funded treatment does not qualify as state action); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1981)
(holding that the actions of a public defender appointed by the state are not state actions).
206
Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321.
207
545 U.S. 469, 472–75 (2005); see also Pennsylvania v. Susquehanna Area Reg’l Airport Auth., 423 F.
Supp. 2d 472, 483 (M.D. Pa 2006) (“Eminent domain is a power unique to the government . . . . A state
legislature may choose to exercise this power directly or indirectly, as in the instant matter, by delegating it.”
(citations omitted)).
208
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473 (“[R]espondent New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private
nonprofit entity . . . was reactivated.”); id. at 475 (“The city council also authorized the NLDC to purchase
property or to acquire property by exercising eminent domain in the City’s name.”); see also Brentwood Acad.
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 299 (2001) (holding that a non-profit organization
composed of representatives from public and private schools was a state actor because the public schools had
delegated their policymaking decisions to the organization).
209
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (“[T]his is not a case in which the City is planning to open the condemned
land—at least not in its entirety—to use by the general public.”).
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sell those rights to someone else.210 As a result, the implementation of crimefree housing ordinances qualifies as a possessory taking under the eminent
domain powers upheld in Kelo.211
Accordingly, the tenant’s property has been subject to a traditional
possessory taking because (1) eminent domain applies to rental properties212 and
has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a compensable interest,213 and
(2) the state is enforcing crime-free housing ordinances through either
delegation or actions that are “fairly attributable”214 to the state.
2. Compulsory Eviction Under Crime-free Housing Ordinances Qualifies
as a Regulatory Taking for the Tenant but Not for the Landlord
There are three ways a government regulation can become a regulatory
taking.215 The first is when the government physically invades the property,216
which is a per se regulatory taking. The second is when the regulations prohibit
all economic use of the property,217 and that economic use would not normally
be prohibited by commonplace nuisance and property law.218 This type of
regulation also qualifies as a per se regulatory taking.219 Finally, if a regulation
does not fit into either of those categories, the court will conduct a multifactor
“factual” analysis, paying special attention to three factors: (1) the economic
effect on the citizen, (2) the degree of interference in the citizen’s expectations
of his or her ability to use the property, and (3) the character of the regulation.220
The first subsection demonstrates that eviction under crime-free housing

210
See Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1149 (“Both the federal one-strike policy and CHOs authorize,
encourage, or require landlords to evict tenants for a single instance of actual or alleged criminal conduct.”).
211
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90.
212
See Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Ariz., 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976) (“It has long been established that the
holder of an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled, under the Fifth Amendment, to just compensation
for the value of that interest when it is taken upon condemnation by the United States.”).
213
See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 (1946).
214
Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
215
See supra Part I.B.1.b.
216
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
217
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1019 (1992)).
218
See Werth, supra note 31, at 4 (“Further, ordinances that include a landlord licensing scheme typically
also impose suspension and/or revocation of the license to rent out property as a penalty for violating the
ordinance or other municipal code provisions, including property maintenance standards.”).
219
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015–16; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 679–80; Singer, supra note 96, at
632 (explaining the per se rule against regulations that deprive owners of all economic use of their property).
220
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224–25 (1986); Singer, supra note 96, at 631.
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ordinances is not a regulatory taking for the landlord, while the following
subsection shows that eviction is a regulatory taking for the tenant under all three
tests.
a. There Has Not Been a Regulatory Taking for the Landlord
Crime-free housing ordinances regulate landlord and tenant interaction.221
Clearly, they qualify as a regulation because they govern the landlord’s
commercial relationship with his or her tenant.222 Crime-free housing ordinances
do not, however, mandate a physical invasion of the landlord’s property. In
Loretto, the case in which the Court established that a physical invasion
constitutes a regulatory taking, a New York City ordinance required a landlord
to allow a cable company to install physical cables and cable boxes on the roof
of rental properties without compensation beyond that apportioned by the
statute.223 In that case, there was a “permanent physical occupation.”224 In
contrast, a crime-free housing ordinance controls what is required in a landlordtenant contract, what types of people the landlord can retain as a tenant, and what
actions the landlord must take upon violation of a lease addendum.225 There is
no physical occupation or physical invasion of the landlord’s property.
The second way enforcement of a crime-free housing ordinance could be a
per se regulatory taking is if enforcement prevents all possible economic use of
the property, and the regulation does not prohibit something that would normally
be barred by the “background principles of nuisance and property law.”226
Therefore, in any case in which the regulation arguably prohibits all economic
use of the property, any analysis has to include a discussion of the nuisance and
property law of the particular state in which the takings occur.227 In the case of

221
See Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1149 (“These crime-free housing ordinances for rental property—a
category of local laws that I have labeled CHOs—are modeled after a federal statute known as the ‘one-strike
policy’ that has been in place for federally subsidized public housing tenants since the late 1980s.”).
222
See Regulation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14 (“Control over something by rule or
restriction”).
223
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 423 (1982).
224
Id. at 426.
225
See Werth, supra note 31, 2–3 (listing the general characteristics of crime-free housing ordinances and
the requirements they make of landlords).
226
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
227
John M. Armentano, Introduction: Regulatory Takings After Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
5 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 1, 9 (1992) (“[B]oth the majority and Justice Kennedy in concurrence, seem to go out of
their way to set forth factual inquires [sic], which should be made at the trial court level, concerning the basis
for the so-called reasonable expectations of property owners.”); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (“Any
limitation . . . must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”).

FLINTFINAL_7.20.21

2021]

7/21/2021 10:43 AM

CRIMINALIZING PROPERTY RIGHTS

1399

crime-free housing ordinances from the landlord’s position, however, there is no
need to delve far into local law because the ordinances do not prohibit all
possible economic use of the property.228 When the landlord evicts a particular
tenant, the landlord can rent the property to someone else.229 Therefore, the
landlord is not deprived of all economic use of the property, just the economic
option of renting to someone who may violate or associate with those who
commit a crime. If the landlord did choose to disobey the ordinance and his or
her license to rent the property was revoked, the landlord might have a stronger
case that all economic use of the property has been squashed by the state taking.
However, the standards for depriving the property owner of all economic uses
are stringent, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that it examines
the “parcel as a whole,” and “where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of
property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking.”230
Because the rescission of a rental license would only occur on certain occasions
where the landlord chose to violate an ordinance that provided for other viable
economic uses (rental to other tenants) for his or her property, the federal courts
would likely reject the notion that the regulation left the landlord without any
way to utilize the land.231
Finally, as Justice Scalia reaffirmed in Lucas,232 if the enforcement of a
regulation does not fit into either of the two per se categories, the courts will
engage in factor balancing to determine if the regulation goes “too far.”233 While
any court could consider a number of factors particular to the specific crime-free
housing ordinance application and challenge, this analysis focuses on the factors
228
The Court has narrowly applied the total-taking test. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe
Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002) (holding that a multi-year building moratorium did not qualify as
a total taking). In a majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court emphasized that the holding
in Lucas “was limited to ‘the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of
land is permitted,’” and therefore the Court should proceed under Penn Central factor balancing. Id. at 330, 332
(quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017).
229
This is unless, of course, the landlord has delayed in evicting the tenant and has lost his or her license
to rent the property. See Werth, supra note 31, at 4 (“Further, ordinances that include a landlord licensing scheme
typically also impose suspension and/or revocation of the license to rent out property as a penalty for violating
the ordinance or other municipal code provisions, including property maintenance standards.”).
230
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 327 (citation omitted).
231
Cf. id. (“This requirement that ‘the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety’ explains . . . why
restrictions on the use of only limited portions of the parcel, such as setback ordinances . . . were not considered
regulatory takings.”) (internal citations omitted).
232
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (describing the two categorical rules for regulatory takings as exceptions to
the general “ad hoc” inquiry of the courts); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 321 (“Resisting
‘the temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction,’ we conclude that the circumstances in
this case are best analyzed within the Penn Central framework.” (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
233
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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of significance that any court would have to consider under Supreme Court
precedent.234 These factors were created in Penn Central,235 and refined in later
cases.236
First, the court would examine the economic impact of the crime-free
housing ordinance on the landlord.237 If a landlord is forced to evict a tenant he
or she would not otherwise evict because of a crime-free housing ordinance, the
landlord would lose the future rent payments from that tenant.238 Unless the
landlord has a specific provision in the contract providing that the tenant must
continue to pay rent for the full term of the lease after eviction,239 the landlord
would be unable to collect rent payments until he or she finds another tenant.
The fact that the landlord loses rent payments from the tenant until he or she
finds a new tenant—a loss that could be indefinite—would seem to point to a
large economic impact on the landlord. However, because the landlord has the
option to prevent this cost by providing for lessee continuance of payment after
forced eviction,240 a court may hold that the economic impact on the landlord is
minimal.
The second—and more complicated—factor a court would consider is how
the regulations have changed “investment-backed expectations.”241
“Investment-backed expectations” has been interpreted to mean “‘an objective,
but fact-specific inquiry into what, under all the circumstances, the [landowner]
should have anticipated.’”242 The test is an objective one and is most concerned
with whether the regulatory regime in question was in place when the property
owner purchased the property.243 The success of the landlord’s claim for this
234

Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224–25 (1986).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
236
See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224–25 (describing the three factors).
237
Id. at 225.
238
49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 575 (2020) (“The general rule is that when a landlord evicts a
tenant and takes possession of the premises, the lease is terminated and the right to claim rent which accrues
after eviction is extinguished.”).
239
Id. (“[T]he parties to a lease may contract to hold the tenant liable for posteviction rent.”).
240
Id. § 575 n.2 (“[W]here a lease provides that a landlord is under no duty to mitigate damages after its
reentry by virtue of its successful prosecution of a summary proceeding, and that the tenant remains liable for
damages, the tenant remains liable for all monetary obligations arising under the lease.” (quoting L’Aquila
Realty, LLC v. Jalyng Food Corp., 50 N.Y.S.3d 128, 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017))).
241
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
242
Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 511 (2009) (quoting Cienega Gardens v. United
States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
243
See id. (“[T]he regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps
to shape the reasonableness of those expectations.” (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633
(2001))); Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1345–46 (“The purpose of consideration of plaintiffs’ investmentbacked expectations is to limit recoveries to property owners who can demonstrate that ‘they bought their
235
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factor may depend on whether the crime-free housing ordinance regime was in
place when he or she started renting the property and was therefore required to
be included in the lease,244 or if the ordinance was found to apply retroactively
or once the lease was renewed.245 If the landlord purchased his or her property
after the statute had been passed requiring all landlords to have crime-free
ordinances in their leases, the landlord would have a much harder time arguing
that the ordinance interfered with his or her reasonable expectations because the
landlord should have known the law before renting property246 and the law
should have shaped his or her expectations. However, if the ordinance was
applied to the landlord’s lease retroactively, or solely because the landlord
renewed an existing lease, the landlord would have a better argument that the
regulation drastically changed the landlord’s investment-backed expectations of
who could be the lessee. Even if a landlord did enter into a leasehold agreement
with a crime-free housing ordinance provision, the landlord could try to argue
that the recency of crime-free housing ordinances in his or her community
(depending on when the ordinance was enacted) and the recency of the
proliferation of the ordinances as a whole247 changed the investment-backed
expectations of years of landlord-tenant common law.248 This argument may be
weaker, especially considering the changes in property law that have advanced
so quickly in the twentieth century.249
The third factor a court would examine is the “character of the government
action.”250 In Connolly, the Court noted that the regulation in question did not
allow the government to “physically invade or permanently appropriate any of
the employer’s assets,” and instead “adjust[ed] the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.”251 The character of the
government’s actions, a mandated payment to ERISA,252 did not point to a
property in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime.’” (quoting
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994))).
244
See Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1151 (“While most CHOs vary in their language and measures,” one
common feature is “the requirement that landlords make tenants sign a crime-free lease addendum as a condition
of the tenancy, which contains language similar to federal public housing leases.”).
245
See, e.g., GRANITE CITY MUN. CODE § 5.142.060 (2016).
246
See generally Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998) (stating “the traditional rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse”).
247
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1153; Wroe, supra note 16, at 133.
248
KLEIN, supra note 145, at 192 (describing how leaseholds date back to “feudal times”).
249
Id. (describing how “courts and legislatures began to promote reform . . . to expand the rights of
residential tenants” as urbanization proceeded).
250
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
251
Id.
252
Id. at 219 (“[The] trustees argued that if the Plan was subject to the provisions of ERISA requiring
premium payments and imposing contingent termination liability, the statute was unconstitutional, as it deprived
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regulatory taking.253 A required eviction of a tenant under a crime-free housing
ordinance also does not involve a physical invasion for the landlord254 and does
not involve a permanent appropriation of the landlord assets. While the
ordinance may permanently affect the landlord’s ability to exercise one of his or
her property rights—to lease and transfer the property to whomever the landlord
chooses—it is not an appropriation of the property itself.255 In applying the third
factor in Esposito v. South Carolina,256 the Fourth Circuit noted that the
regulation allowed the “plaintiffs to continue their existing use of their property
and dwellings in the same manner that they could have used the property prior
to its enactment,” and retained the “fundamental incidents of ownership” with
only a decrease in “their discretion to rebuild a structure.”257 Similarly, the
landlord can continue to rent out his or her property with a crime-free housing
addendum on the lease, though the landlord has less discretion to retain the
tenants of his or her choice.258
Because the landlord can contract around the economic impact of a crimefree housing ordinance and the character of the government action does not
resemble a taking, courts would likely hold that an eviction under a crime-free
housing ordinance is not a regulatory taking for the landlord, regardless of the
impact on the landlord’s expectations. Because the landlord does not endure a
physical invasion or the destruction of all economically beneficial uses of his or
her property and a regulatory taking is not established by the three-factor test,259
courts would likely hold that a regulatory taking has not occurred.
b. There Has Been a Regulatory Taking for the Tenant
Proceeding under the same regulatory taking framework, the first test to
determine if a tenant evicted under a crime-free housing ordinance has
experienced a regulatory taking is the physical invasion test.260 Depending on
the requirements of the municipality,261 the tenant may be able to argue that the
the Trustees, the employers, and the plan participants of property without due process and without proper
compensation.”).
253
Id. at 225.
254
See supra Part II.B.1.a.
255
See Werth, supra note 31, at 4.
256
939 F.2d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1991).
257
Id.
258
See Werth, supra note 31, at 3 (describing the landlord’s duties under a crime-free housing ordinance).
259
See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225–27.
260
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (“In general (at least with regard to
permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind
it, we have required compensation.”).
261
Werth, supra note 31, at 2.
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municipal government has “physically invaded” the tenant’s home. If the police
knocked on the door and served the tenants or landlord with compulsory eviction
demands,262 the tenants would have a strong argument that the government was
physically invading—by coming onto their property to forcibly remove them
from their home. Additionally, if the tenants’ landlord physically invaded the
home to force the tenant to move, the landlord would be serving as a state actor,
and the physical invasion test would also be met.263 The government can force
the tenants to leave by filing injunctions against the landlord or rescinding the
landlord’s rental license;264 if the tenants stay on the property, the landlord
would be breaking the law. With such an injunction, the government
permanently physically displaces the tenants and forces them to move from the
property, destroying all the tenants’ property rights.265 The tenants would likely
be successful in arguing that their own physical displacement266—especially if
the police came to their property to remove them—qualifies as a physical
invasion by the government.
Unlike the landlord, the tenant’s eviction does pass the second test267 for
identifying per se regulatory takings. Enforcement of a crime-free housing
ordinances against a tenant denies him or her “all economically beneficial or
productive use of land”268 because the tenant loses all leasehold property rights
to the land after being evicted.269 After a taking due to a crime-free housing
ordinance, the tenant cannot sublet the property or assign it in exchange for value
and cannot use the land as a home.270

262
See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 1, at 2 (“On two occasions, officers have even pounded on Jessica and
Kenny’s door to serve compulsory-eviction demands.”).
263
See supra Part II.B.2.b.
264
Werth, supra note 31, at 4.
265
Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“Property rights in a
physical thing have been described as the rights ‘to possess, use and dispose of it.’ To the extent that the
government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys each of these rights.” (quoting
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945))).
266
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1151 (“Most significantly, CHOs either explicitly require landlords to evict
tenants who are accused of criminal conduct . . . .”).
267
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (“The second situation in which we have
found categorical treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land.”).
268
Id.
269
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435; cf. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 331–32 (2002) (holding that a temporary moratorium on building does not qualify as a total taking under
Lucas). Unlike a temporary taking, a compulsory eviction under a crime-free housing ordinance would be a total
taking for the tenant.
270
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1151–52 (“[M]any private-market tenants are at risk of losing their homes.”).
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To prevent the crime-free housing ordinance from being struck down under
the Fifth Amendment, the state would have to prove that the ordinances have
their roots in state property and nuisance laws.271 In the case of crime-free
housing ordinances, if the “regulated activity”—housing someone who has
committed a crime—“is some form of nuisance or noxious use subject to
regulation by common law,” then the municipality would not have to
compensate the property owners.272 While nuisance and property law are defined
by the states,273 and therefore differ throughout the common law system, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts definitions may be helpful in determining the
majority rules prevalent in the states.274 The Restatement defines public
nuisance275 as conduct that interferes with the rights of the general public.276
Section 821B says,
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with
a public right is unreasonable include the following:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with
the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public
comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation, or

271
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031–32 (“[A]s it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a commonlaw action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property
law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found.”); Henry
N. Butler, Regulatory Takings After Lucas, 16 REGUL. 76, 80 (1993) (“The negative implication of this position
is that if the activity was previously permitted under relevant property and nuisance principles, then the
prohibition of the activity would be a total regulatory taking that must be compensated.”).
272
Butler, supra note 271, at 80.
273
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (“In light of our traditional resort to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law’ to define the range of interests that qualify for protection as
‘property’ under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, this recognition that the Takings Clause does not require
compensation when an owner is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by those ‘existing rules or
understandings’ is surely unexceptional.” (citation omitted)).
274
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 rep’s note (AM. L. INST. 1979) (listing cases adopting the
position of the Restatement including Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Missouri). The Lucas opinion itself specifically cites five different sections in the Restatement
as examples of factors to be considered in a nuisance analysis. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31 (specifically
mentioning §§ 826, 827, 828(a) and (b), 831, and 830).
275
Because crime-free housing ordinances are enforced by the state through the landlord and do not
involve a nuisance case between the tenant and the landlord or another private party alone, they would most
likely be evaluated through the public nuisance doctrine. See infra text accompanying note 277.
276
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 rep’s note (AM. L. INST. 1979).
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(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.277

Lucas specifies that to determine whether there has been a “total taking” under
the new nuisance requirements, a court should look at a number of factors,
including harm caused by the activity to neighboring “public lands and
resources, or adjacent private property,” the “social value” of the plaintiff’s
activities that are being prohibited by the state, the “suitability” of those
activities to “the locality in question,” and “the relative ease with which the
alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the
government.”278
Here, the harm to neighboring public or private lands likely does not qualify
as a public nuisance under the Restatement definition or under the factors
identified by the Supreme Court in Lucas. First, under Restatement § 821B(1)
and (2)(c), housing someone who has committed a crime and rents a home likely
does not qualify as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public,” or a “significant effect upon the public right,” because a public
right to restrict housing for those who associate with criminals does not exist.279
Even if a state was successful in arguing that it exists now that crime-free
housing ordinances have been implemented, there is likely no “background” of
such a right in the common law, since the right would have been created rather
recently with the proliferation of crime-free housing ordinances in the early
2000s.280 Crime-free housing ordinances are also unlikely to qualify as public
nuisances under Restatement § 821B(2)(a) because merely housing a person
who committed a crime likely does not create a “significant interference
with . . . public safety” or the “public peace” that has long been recognized in

277

Id. § 821B.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31.
279
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b. (AM. L. INST. 1979). (“At common law public nuisance
came to cover a large, miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal offenses, all of which involved
some interference with the interests of the community at large—interests that were recognized as rights of the
general public entitled to protection.”). Crime-free housing ordinances do not protect a public right that is
directly harmed by the tenant’s action, such as harm to a neighbor’s property through pollution or obstruction.
Instead, crime-free housing ordinances protect against a speculative crime that could be caused by a tenant
housing a criminal. The ability to evict someone merely for committing a crime or housing a guest who
committed one is not a broad and tangible public disturbance like those listed in the Restatement. Such a
sweeping use of government eviction power is also in conflict with the common law respect for privacy of the
home and freedom of association. Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992) (holding
that there is no background principle of common law that creates a total ban on all construction on private
property).
280
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1148; Wroe, supra note 16, at 133.
278
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the common law.281 In later years, public nuisance doctrine developed to include
statutory crimes as well as common law crimes.282 While there is likely no
common law right to prohibit a person who committed a crime from receiving
housing, state or local governments could argue that the crime-free housing
ordinances are recognizable and enforceable as statutorily created public
nuisance laws.283 However, almost ten years after Lucas, the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that “a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional
absent compensation” can be “transformed into a background principle of the
State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title.”284 Therefore, simply having
passed a crime-free housing ordinance would not be sufficient to create a
“background principle of the State’s Law.”285 The recent implementation286 of
crime-free housing ordinances stands in contrast to background principles
upheld in the lower courts.287 Additionally, the Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
opinion notes that “[a] regulation or common-law rule cannot be a background
principle for some owners but not for others.”288 Crime-free housing ordinances
only apply to renters, and therefore only apply to some property owners and not
others.

281
Cf. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 732 (2010) (“The
Takings Clause only protects property rights as they are established under state law, not as they might have been
established or ought to have been established.”); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is a distinction between simply not being disturbed in the particular use of one’s
property and having the right to that use of the property. . . . [F]or there to be a cognizable property interest
sufficient to support a takings claim, the latter must be true.”).
282
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b. (AM. L. INST. 1979) (“Many states no longer recognize
common law crimes, treating the criminal law as entirely statutory.”).
283
See id. § 821B cmt. c. (“[G]eneral statutes have been adopted in most of the states to provide criminal
penalties for public nuisances . . . . These statutes uniformly have been construed to include the interferences
with the rights of the public that were public nuisances at common law.”).
284
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629–30 (2001).
285
See id. at 630 (“A law does not become a background principle for subsequent owners by enactment
itself.”); Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. State of Hawaii Land Use Comm’n, No. 11-00414 SOM-BMK, 2016 WL
797567, at *9 (D. Haw. Feb. 29, 2016) (holding that the statutory requirement of obtaining an environmental
impact survey before development was not in Hawaii’s background principles of nuisance law).
286
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1148; Wroe, supra note 16, 133.
287
See Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (2002) (upholding a state prohibition
on development because (1) the state’s public trust doctrine qualified as a background principle of nuisance law,
and (2) the public trust doctrine is embodied in the Washington Constitution and in statute and has a long history
in the state); In re Davis, 539 B.R. 334, 349 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015) (holding that the Homestead Exemption
in Ohio is a background principle of state law because it has been enforced for over 160 years); Stevens v. City
of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 454, 456 (Or. 1993) (upholding public control over Oregon’s ocean shores as
a “notorious . . . common law doctrine of custom” for over 80 years).
288
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
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Under the “total-taking” analysis289 of “objective factors”290 described in
Lucas, crime-free housing ordinances also fail to qualify as part of the
background principles of public nuisance law. There is no direct harm to
neighboring “public lands” or “adjacent private property,” and the “social value”
of the tenants’ activity—the ability to associate with whom they desire and keep
their property as long as the landlord is satisfied with their tenancy—would
likely be regarded as retaining strong social value for the Court, especially
because of the common law respect for privacy and property interests in the
home.291 There is no question of the “suitability”292 of the tenant’s activities to
the property in question because the only activities in question are the tenant’s
ability to remain in the property he or she rented and to associate with whomever
he or she chooses. Additionally, the Court would likely not accept that there is a
“relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures
taken by the claimant and the government,”293 and would instead view the
ordinances as major interferences with the property rights of tenants. The Lucas
Court also notes that “[t]he fact that a particular use has long been engaged in
by similarly situated owners” and “the fact that other landowners, similarly
situated, are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant” both indicate
“a lack of any common-law prohibition.”294 Both of these factors apply to
municipalities with crime-free housing ordinances, as the regulations are fairly
new limitations on tenant’s property rights that don’t apply to other landowners,
i.e., non-renters.295 Therefore, it is likely that compulsory evictions are
regulatory takings because the evictions prohibit the tenants from engaging in
all economic use of the property and the regulations do not prohibit something
that would normally be prohibited in the “background principles of nuisance and
property law.”296

289

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
291
See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (“Resistance to these practices had
established the principle which was enacted into the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man’s
house was his castle and not to be invaded by any general authority.”). Crime-free housing ordinances also stand
in contrast to the examples the Court gave as takings that would be permitted under a state’s background
principles of nuisance. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (“The owner of a lakebed, for example, would not be entitled
to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the
effect of flooding others’ land.”).
292
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 1031 (“The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners
ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition . . . . So also does the fact that other landowners,
similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant.” (citations omitted)).
295
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1151.
296
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
290
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Finally, if the Court held that a compulsory eviction did not qualify as a
physical invasion or a total taking against the tenant, the Court would determine
if the government action qualified as a regulatory taking under the third and final
test, the ad hoc factual inquiry test.297 Under the Penn Central factors, the Court
would consider the economic impact of the taking on the tenant.298 Then, the
Court would look at how the regulations have altered “investment-backed
expectations.”299 Lastly, the Court would look at the third factor, the “character
of the government action.”300 After considering the circumstances, Court would
likely decide that compulsory evictions are regulatory takings for the tenants.
First, the economic impact on the tenant is significant. When the tenant is
evicted, the tenant loses the right to reside in his or her home for the term of the
lease.301 The tenant may even be forced, through the terms of the lease, to
continue paying rent,302 thereby doubling the tenant’s housing costs (as the
tenant has to pay for new housing and the old). Eviction can cause homelessness
and poverty for the tenant.303 If, such as in Barron,304 the tenant has a rent-toown contract, the tenant would also lose the larger, permanent interest in the
home for which he or she had already paid.
Under the second factor, the objective investment-backed expectations of
the property owner, the Court would analyze whether a tenant “should have
anticipated” the forced eviction.305 The analysis for the tenant would be similar
to the analysis conducted for the landowner306 and would depend on whether the
crime-free housing ordinance was in place before the tenant entered into the
lease.307 If the statute was applied retroactively, or enacted after the tenant
297
Id. at 1015 (describing the two categorical rules for regulatory takings as exceptions to the general “ad
hoc” inquiry of the courts).
298
See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
299
Id. While such a requirement is created through legal bargaining between the landlord and the tenant,
and therefore could in theory be avoided by the tenant, bargaining power between lessees and lessors is often
not equal. See Charles A. Heckman, Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code: Government of the Lessor, by
the Lessor, and for the Lessor, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 309, 309 (1992).
300
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
301
Eviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14.
302
See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 575 (2020)
303
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1178 (“For a long time, eviction has been viewed as a consequence of
poverty, but only recently have social scientists begun to consider eviction as a driver of poverty. . . . [E]viction
leads to a number of social problems, including negative health outcomes, homelessness, deeper poverty, and
neighborhood destabilization.”).
304
Complaint, supra note 1, at 11.
305
Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 511 (2009) (quoting Cienega Gardens v. United
States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
306
See supra Part II.B.2.a.
307
See Res. Invs., Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at 511 (“[T]he regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant
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entered into the lease, the tenant would likely be successful in arguing that the
regulatory taking interrupted his or her investment-backed expectations.308
However, if the ordinance was in place before the lease began, the tenant could
try to argue that the recency of the use of crime-free housing ordinances meant
that investment-backed expectations remain unaltered by their
implementation.309 In this scenario, the factor may go against finding a
regulatory taking.
Unlike in the landlord analysis, the third and final factor—the “character of
the government action”310 taken against the tenant—would likely fall in favor of
a regulatory taking designation. Instead of altering the “benefits and burdens of
economic life,”311 compulsory evictions are “permanent” appropriations of the
tenant’s property and may involve physical invasions, as noted above, even if
the land does not transfer directly to the government.312 Unlike the plaintiffs
subject to the regulation in Esposito, the tenants evicted for violating a crimefree housing ordinance cannot continue to use the property in the same manner
they did before the regulation, as an evicted tenant has lost all of his or her
property rights through eviction.313 Because the government has removed all of
“the fundamental incidents of ownership” from the tenant, the Court would
likely find that the third factor indicates that a compulsory eviction has
occurred.314
Because two of the three major factors the Court uses to engage in ad hoc
balancing under the third regulatory taking framework indicate that a regulatory
taking has occurred after a compulsory eviction, the Court would likely hold that
a regulatory taking has occurred under the third regulatory takings test as well.

acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations.” (citation omitted));
Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1345–46 (“The purpose of consideration of plaintiffs’ investment-backed
expectations is to limit recoveries to property owners who can demonstrate that they bought their property in
reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime.” (quoting Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (1994))).
308
Res. Invs., Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at 511 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001)).
309
See id.
310
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
311
Id.
312
Id. However, lack of transfer directly to the government is not determinative because the eviction is
“fairly attributable” to the state. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
313
Esposito v. S.C. Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1991) (“We find that the Act permitted
the Esposito plaintiffs to continue their existing use of their property and dwellings in the same manner that they
could have used the property prior to its enactment.”).
314
Id.
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C. The Taking Was for Public Use and Requires Just Compensation
The final element the tenant would have to prove is that the taking was for
public use. Once established, the only question remaining would be the amount
of compensation owed to the tenant.
Because the Supreme Court has expanded its definition of public use so that
“virtually any taking will meet the requirement,”315 it is likely the Court would
hold that the regulatory taking of a tenant’s property during the enforcement of
a crime-free housing ordinance is for public use. The Court has upheld takings
to diversify property rights,316 to preserve the environment,317 and to increase
property values and remove blight.318 Even though the government itself is not
using the property after the taking, an allocation between private property
owners to improve “an economically distressed city”319—like that which was
upheld in Kelo320—is similar to an allocation between private property owners
in a neighborhood distressed with crime, or a forced allocation from someone
who is a greater risk of inviting crime into the neighborhood (because he or she
housed someone who committed a crime) to someone who is not. The original
crime-free housing ordinance that applied to federal housing under the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988 was created to keep “criminal activity that threatens
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
tenants” out of public housing.321 Local governments that copied the federal
“one-strike policy” did so for the same public purpose.322
The tenant is owed just compensation because the government has engaged
in a regulatory taking from the tenant.323 Just compensation is determined by

315

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 708.
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231–32 (1989) (holding that the public use requirement
does not “prohibit[] the State of Hawaii from taking, with just compensation, title . . . in order to reduce the
concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State”).
317
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 (2002) (“This case actually
involves two moratoria ordered by respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to maintain the status
quo while studying the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and designing a strategy for environmentally
sound growth.”).
318
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005) (“In 2000, the city of New London approved a
development plan that, in the words of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, was ‘projected to create in excess of
1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its
downtown and waterfront areas.’” (citation omitted)).
319
Id.
320
Id. at 489–90.
321
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).
322
Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1194; Wroe, supra note 16, at 129.
323
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 718 (“The Constitution clearly envisions that the government will
take private property for public use, but it requires that the government pay for it. The standard of payment is
316

FLINTFINAL_7.20.21

2021]

7/21/2021 10:43 AM

CRIMINALIZING PROPERTY RIGHTS

1411

calculating the loss to the property owner rather than the value of the taking by
the government.324 The tenant would be entitled to the market value of the
remainder of his or her lease minus the value of the rent the tenant would have
paid.325 Unfortunately for the tenant, the market value of the lease may not be
equal to the original terms of the lease, and the tenant may be paid back less than
he or she would have paid to remain on the property.326 Regardless, any tenant
subject to eviction under a crime-free housing ordinance could file an inverse
condemnation suit, which permits a citizen to sue the government for
compensation after a taking has been made.327 Through that suit, the tenant
would likely be able to recover the market value for the remainder of the tenant’s
lease and the value of any lost option to renew or buy minus the amount of rent
that remained for the lease term.328
CONCLUSION
Crime-free housing ordinances are problematic in numerous ways. They
intrude on a tenant’s right to privacy, freedom of association, and property
rights. Despite the large number of crime-free housing ordinances enacted and
enforced across the country, the ordinances have generally evaded the public’s
attention and have rarely been challenged. Going forward, advocates should
consider all the arguments possibly in their favor before entering the courtroom
to make their case. If the Barron case had gone forward, the Fifth Amendment
argument may have prevailed, which would have allowed Jessica and Kenny,
the tenants from the Introduction, to strike down the crime-free housing
ordinance without relying on the legislature to act.

‘just compensation.’”).
324
See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235–36 (2003) (“All of the Circuit Judges
and District Judges who have confronted the compensation question, both in this case and in Phillips, have
agreed that the ‘just compensation’ required by the Fifth Amendment is measured by the property owner’s loss
rather than the government’s gain.”); Bos. Chamber of Com. v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) (“And the
question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.”).
325
See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 381 (1946); see also Comm. on Leases, Am. Bar
Ass’n, Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 226, 299 (1968) (“Where the
government condemns the tenant’s entire leasehold estate, the tenant is entitled to lump sum compensation for
the value of the term taken less the value of the rent which the tenant would have been required to pay.”).
326
Fair Market Value, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14 (“The price that a seller is willing to
accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm’s-length transaction; the point at which
supply and demand intersect.”).
327
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 719 (“One form of action is an ‘inverse condemnation suit,’ where an
individual claims that a government action constitutes a taking.”).
328
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 380–81.
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The Fifth Amendment provides a strong constitutional case against crimefree housing ordinances that could be valuable to those concerned with the
increasing number of ordinances329 and those being prosecuted under them. If
the Fifth Amendment can be used by tenants to challenge compulsory eviction,
they may have a better shot at success than through an equal protection330 or
freedom of association argument, especially if their city gives them adequate
procedures to survive a procedural due process challenge.331 After the decisions
in Lucas332 and the plurality opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment,333 it
seems that the Supreme Court may be open to recognizing a wider range of state
action as regulatory takings. Additionally, by challenging crime-free housing
ordinances through a property rights approach, plaintiffs may be able to win over
conservative judges that might not have been as sympathetic to an equal
protection or First Amendment appeal. Tenants and advocates should utilize the
momentum and current makeup of the Supreme Court to challenge crime-free
housing ordinances on Fifth Amendment grounds.
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See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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